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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, our strategy of forward presence has radically changed to one of power projection. As the old borders have crumbled and conflict has erupted in often austere regions, the US military has found itself deploying to unlikely areas including the Persian Gulf, the Balkans and even East Timor. The current strategic environment includes multiple simultaneous small-scale contingencies (SSC) and the full-scale preparation for future operations in Iraq, a major war.
The recently published National Security Strategy, and all the nested strategies below it, recognizes the need to deploy a decisive force rapidly. Through studies like the Joint Mobility Requirements Study and the Army Strategic Mobility Plan, huge amounts of resources have created, or enhanced, Army Pre-positioned Stocks and the fleet of very capable Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships. We have focused on upgrading capabilities through the procurement of new systems or the upgrade of infrastructure. We have failed to significantly increase the depth and breadth of organizations capable of executing these missions. "Recent force structure reductions, decreased forward presence, reduced defense funding, and increased operations tempo exacerbate current inefficiencies and make modernization and improvement of the current joint deployment and redeployment processes vital to achieving the National Military Strategy." 1 This paper will examine the last phase of the deployment process, Joint Reception, Staging, On-ward Movement and Integration (JRSOI), and then illustrate key points by examining a case study of these operations in the Balkans. It will examine the following issues:
• Doctrine and force structure are built to respond to full, high-intensity major combat operations and not to multiple, small-scale contingencies. We have invested heavily in materiel solutions to deployment weaknesses, but Army doctrine is relegated to transportation tactics, techniques and procedures instead of an operational mission.
• A large part of the Army's combat support and combat service support (CSS) force structures, particularly at echelons above Corps (EAC), are not resident in the active force. The active force is small, multi-tasked and incapable of meeting mission requirements at the present operational tempo without significant augmentation.
• Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) can adequately meet its continental US (CONUS) transportation mission only after mobilizing the reserve component and is limited outside the continental US (OCONUS) to that of port management.
• JRSOI is conducted at a place which generally resembles an intermediate staging base (ISB) requiring both aerial and sea ports, transportation mode transfer points, staging areas, marshalling areas and life support areas.
This task must be preformed by a command over and above the port support activity. A port task force that includes all the JRSOI functions and also includes force protection responsibilities needs to be codified in Army doctrine.
• There is no single deployment integrator for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) requiring a multitude of complex and often ambiguous command relationships.
While the Theater Support Command (TSC) and the Cargo Transfer Company initiatives made some marginally effective organizational changes, the Army is severely limited in the scope of operations. By relying on the reserve component for, at best, 50% of our capability (e.g. total terminal units) and, at worst, to 100% of our capability (e.g. Port Security units). Some would argue for more force structure or a larger US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) role. Most of the doctrine concerning JRSOI has relegated the mission to a logistics function and, generally, it falls into the transportation community; however, it is clearly an operational mission. Instead of trying to document the need for more transportation force structure and confusing the issue of who is in charge of a port, the Army should capitalize and formalize the tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting this mission, regardless of dedicated force structure. JRSOI should be a battle task under the mission essential task of deploy/redeploy required of all units. Whether deploying or not, most units will be in the process of deploying or acting as a "pusher" for those units that are in the active phase of deploying until it is their turn.
JRSOI are integral parts of the Army's power projection capability. Since Operation Desert Shield, an enormous amount of energy has been focused on improving the Army's ability to accomplish this mission within detailed standards. The advent of US involvement in the Balkans, which requires Transfers of Authority (TOAs) four times a year, required new ways of resourcing this mission. A TOA is the central integration process by which one unit relieves another unit. It greatly expands the time window when both forces are on the ground simultaneously, incorporating a "right seat"
"left seat" model to ensure a unit is certified to execute its new mission. Subordinate units are required to build capability before a new task force headquarters assumes the entire mission.
The Balkans is representative of the typical SSC challenges Army forces will face in projecting power, short of a major war and mobilization. Although doctrine exists to perform JRSOI, it relies on units that are not in the active component and, thus, not available to execute as often, nor for as long as the SSC missions typically require. working in an uncertain threat environment. A secure environment is essential to conducting RSO effectively and efficiently while recognizing the inherently vulnerable nature of the process. Additionally, as the Army quickly moves to an interim force and adopts the deployability goals of transformation, the requirements of conducting RSOI are greatly accelerated. This paper will attempt to link the conceptual framework of RSOI, ISB and the handoff between the strategic and operational levels of maneuver. It will use JRSOI in the Balkans as a case study to illustrate a mature theater coping with two simultaneous SSCs without the benefit of mobilization.
INSIDE JRSOI
This paper will address the current strategic environment the US military. Three SSC's: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the full-scale preparation for future major combat operations in Iraq. The distinguishing features of this strategic context include: a continuous appetite for rapid deployment, the inability to use reserve component forces that aren't activated, the reliance on unit rotations and their cyclical demand for wholesale deployment and redeployment of a force, the uncertain security environment and the cost-benefit of increasing preparedness.
JRSOI is the final phase of the joint deployment process. It is also the handoff between the strategic and operational levels. Fundamentally, it is a sequential regeneration of combat power, or reassembly of units that were broken down to suit the limitations of the transportation system. The principles of JRSOI include unity of command, synchronization and balance.
2 JRSOI is inherently joint, but within this paper, it will primarily address the Army perspective of operations. The fundamentally question is: who does JRSOI?
JOINT DOCTRINE Joint doctrine clearly specifies that the supported Combatant Commander is responsible for JRSOI in the Theater. Joint doctrine defines a Global Distribution System made up of two primary segments. "The first segment is the strategic-national LOC segment composed of points of origin or sources of supply external to a supported combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR). The second primary LOC segment in the global distribution system is the in-theater segment that extends from ports of debarkation, points of origin, or sources of supply to final destinations or points of need internal to an AOR. Operation of the in-theater portion of the global distribution system is the responsibility of the supported combatant commander." 3 Clearly there is a seam in the deployment process that ideally is minimized, yet provides an opportunity for friction.
The supported Combatant Commander normally delegates the responsibility for operation of terminals to the proper service component commanders. As an example, the Combatant Commander may assign air terminal responsibilities to the Commander of Air Forces and water terminal operations to the Army or Navy Component
Commander. It is also evident that the Army, as the primary force involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, has the predominant requirements for this mission. 4 The JFC will routinely assign the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) as executive agent for JRSOI. The ASCC will typically designate the senior support commander to provide unity of command to execute JRSOI, and specific units will be assigned or placed under the operational control of the senior support command to provide operational capability.
The arrival of strategic air and sealift will be controlled by the JFC through the Additionally, the MTMC Operations Center receives and disseminates intelligence updates keyed to operations worldwide. 14 In fact, this organizational "flattening" through centralized management has been so successful that MTMC is examining elimination of the Group Headquarters.
15
With reorganization have come dangerous perceptions, as indicated by a recent Transportation Center study to reorganize MTMC. "Today MTMC is an efficient business organization which accomplishes its stated mission. However, it has separated itself from the mainstream Army and has moved away from it's deployment support and training mission moving more and more to the operation of ports, "assisting units" (with no formal responsibilities in execution) to deploy from post, camps, and stations." Marine JRSOI, the Naval Cargo Handling and Port Group are the port operators and rely on the DST to oversee port operations and provide cargo in-transit visibility.
The port operator owns the PSA. "The PSA is a temporary military augmentation organization comprised of personnel with specific skills that aid the port manager in receiving, processing, and clearing cargo at the port. The MTMC port manager determines the required composition of the PSA and coordinates the necessary capabilities. Again, the assets for the PSA may come from MTMC, ARFOR, contract sources or a combination of these. The PSA works directly for the port operator, who reports to the port manager. The size and composition of the PSA varies according to METT-TC. However, the PSA always needs four basic elements: command (such as a company or battalion headquarters), movements (drivers to move cargo and vehicles from the vessel to the marshaling area), maintenance (to ensure operability of materiel handling equipment and recovery vehicles); and security (to provide port-side security)."
18 Again, the doctrine shows some ambiguity particularly if the port operator is contracted in which case the PSA may report to the overall PTF commander or the port manager.
THE THEATER SUPPORT COMMAND
The TSC is the main operational Army support command responsible to provide JRSOI support. Its subordinate organizations include those that provide traditional CSS functions. 19 The TSC, however, has many challenges in conducting JRSOI, which require augmentation and direction from the ASCC.
The TSC and the cargo transfer company were the Army's organizational solution to the RSOI process. The TSC is the senior Army multifunctional combat support and combat service support organization in theater and was established to execute RSOI and sustain the ground campaign in an overseas theater. It has no fixed structure. The structure is tailored to meet the unique missions of a specific theater and may include functional and multifunctional organizations. Although it is not prescribed in doctrine, it may include many of the major functional commands in the ASCC such as the 
USAREUR has developed goals for strategic responsiveness by developing its
Logistics XXI and Power Projection axes as part of the USAREUR Theater Plan. The goal is to focus toward truly achieving a single sustainer and a CSS structure built around a distribution-based logistics system and complemented by integration of contract augmentation across the full spectrum of operations. Achieving velocity and precision in the distribution-based logistics system of the future will be the critical elements in overcoming cultural demands and the continuously competing demands on both strategic and intra-theater lift. 23 USAREUR's logistics imperatives are: peacetime readiness; rapid force projection; RSOI; tactical and operational sustainment and vertical integration -tactical to wholesale, despite a constant balancing of available resources.
MISSION
Operate a multi-port, multi-mode reception, staging and onward movement site in a foreign country in order to meet transfer of authority timelines; then, reverse RSO the redeploying force as soon as possible to facilitate reconstitution.
Key Tasks:
• Operate a Sea Port of Debarkation/Embarkation.
• Operate an Aerial Port of Debarkation/Embarkation.
• Receive soldiers and equipment into theater.
• Staging, assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel and equipment into units and forces, incrementally building combat power and preparing units for onward movement.
• Onward movement by operating a railhead and trailer/container terminal to move materiel from reception facilities and marshalling or staging areas to tactical assembly areas (TAAs) or other theater destinations.
• Provide a Life Support Area.
• Protect the Force. MTMC is given primary responsibility for everything within the seaport perimeter and contracts for all services, usually through a commercial port-handling agency. This has included, but is not limited to: security, stevedores, longshoreman, materiel handling equipment, sanitation and lashing teams. MTMC is subsequently reimbursed for cost and can maintain a minimum footprint for the shortest duration. This port manager role also facilitates long-term habitual relationships between the host nation port authorities since they typically deal with the same people regardless of the RSO Task Force structure. In foreign countries, long-term personal relationships with individuals who speak the native language are vital to crossing cultural boundaries. Building on past successes cements trust and credibility, eliminating the need to start from scratch for each mission. MTMC's mission is a subset of the entire RSO process. They receive limited direction while providing key transportation data not only to the JFC, but also to the worldwide operations and logistics community through in-transit visibility.
PORT OPERATOR
The port operator is a combination of commercial contractor, a PSA provided by the TFE or TFF and a sizable helicopter support slice provided by the Theater AVIM, 2- The local physician is used as a backup to the military physician. Additional services such as radiology and laboratory services are contracted, as required. The dentist is used for extreme dental emergencies that cannot wait for evacuation to a US medical facility. A veterinarian provides care to the military working dogs. The pharmacy provides back-up or supplemental medications to the medical detachment. This arrangement allows for minimal deployment of US Army medical assets into the area of operations, but still provides the port population sufficient medical coverage with built-in redundancy.
Unfortunately, wherever alternatives to soldier support cannot be obtained, additional soldiers must be deployed, which adds to the overall support requirements.
COMMUNICATIONS
The 5 As an extension of distribution-based logistics, supply chain management is a major transformational concept borrowed from private industry. The real danger of considering JRSOI, as a sub-component of the supply chain, is that it belittles its operational importance and continues to make it a logistics mission when, in fact, it is an operational mission. While the logistics community can be tasked with the RSO functions, the maneuver commander must perform integration of his force.
Ultimately, the job of RSOI is the Theater Combatant Commander's. Strategic agility, a tenant of Army transformation, is the throughput of combat power and the synergy of strategic movement with operational maneuver. Fighting from strategic distances equates to, the less JRSOI, the better.
The fact that much of the EAC and CSS force structure is not resident in the active force is not likely to change, but the issue is under examination by the highest levels of the Department of Defense. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, recently stated: "
My personal view is that I've got a group of folks reviewing the current arrangement because my instinct is that it doesn't make sense to have the people who are required very early in a conflict in the reserves. I think we need to have those skills on active duty as well as in the Reserves and we need to be able to live in the world we're living in.
Here we are, we've got some activity in Bosnia, we've got some activity in Kosovo, we're training some folks in the state of Georgia --in the country of Georgia, we're helping out in This study of JRSOI highlights the following issues:
• Doctrine and force structure must respond to the environment of smallscale contingencies. It is imperative that JRSOI is documented as an operational mission, not just a logistics function.
• Critical combat support and combat service support structure needs to be placed back in the active duty component.
• MTMC is limited outside the continental US (OCONUS) to that of port management.
• A port task force that includes all the JRSOI functions and also includes force protection responsibilities needs to be codified in Army doctrine.
• A single deployment integrator similar to the DIRMOBFOR could enhance the deployment process.
The key to meeting the operational tempo presented by the current strategic environment is a collaborative effort under the responsibility of a single commander. Balance is achieved by ensuring that people, equipment, materiel, and information flow are directed at a rate that can be accommodated at every point along the entire network from origin to destination. 
